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ITSUKO MORI*

The Difference Between U.S. Discovery
and Japanese Taking of Evidence
While I was reviewing papers prepared by the panelists for this session
as coordinator, I noted several points that might cause difficulties both
to American readers and to Japanese readers.
The first point is the big difference between the American methods and
the Japanese methods for gathering evidentiary facts and presenting them
to courts. Such difference can be seen in regard to (i) the time when
gathering of evidentiary facts is allowed, (ii) the places where evidentiary
facts can be gathered, (iii) the necessity or extent of judges' participation
in and control over the gathering, and (iv) the standard of relevancy.
In Japan, we do not have so-called pretrial discovery as seen in the
U.S. system. The only way in Japan to gather evidentiary facts before
initiation of the trial is to resort to the special procedure available for
preservation of evidence (Shoko-Hozen). The procedure is provided for
in order to secure for some limited cases a way to preserve evidence that
otherwise might be lost before trial through the death or disappearance
of key witnesses or parties to the case, or the like. Even in this procedure
the vehicle to gather (with a certain sanction) evidentiary facts is always
the court. Witnesses can be examined only at the court except in very
rare cases.
Also, in Japan, authority and control over the gathering of evidentiary
facts are vested only in a court, and activities for the gathering must be
taken by the court itself. Such power will never be used for any purposes
other than for collection of evidence for use in the civil trial. The scope
of facts to be gathered must be limited by the evidentiary standard of
relevancy. Consequently, the role of lawyers in gathering facts is very
limited. Lawyers themselves have no power to gather facts outside of
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courts and always must ask for voluntary cooperation of third parties or
the opposite party or for the court's involvement.
On the other hand, fact gathering in the U.S. system is largely made
as pretrial discovery and is, generally speaking, not a public function
performed by judges. Instead, it is primarily a private matter, conducted
by lawyers according to certain procedures, although their rights are backed
up by the law. I understand that the present U.S. discovery system places
the initiation, use, and response to discovery within the control of the
lawyers. Furthermore, I understand, the discovery standard of relevancy
is not limited by the evidentiary standard of admissibility. It is much
broader in scope and encompasses any information that relates to the
subject matter of a case regardless of its admissibility at trial. Perhaps
because of this broadness, we know that there has been controversy in
the United States as to how to prevent abuse of discovery.
As noted above, the U.S. methods for gathering evidentiary facts are
different from the Japanese methods for the same. This difference comes
from the fact that Japan has no system equivalent to U.S. discovery
practice. I understand that U.S. discovery practice encourages attorneys
to cooperate reasonably during the exchange of discovery information.
The purposes of discovery include early and thorough disclosure of information by all sides, promotion of a negotiated settlement, and equalizing of the investigative resources of both sides without allowing one
side to take undue advantage of the other. If so, they are completely
different from the purposes of taking of evidence in Japan. Accordingly
it might create confusion if we discuss the U.S. discovery system in
parallel with the Japanese system for taking evidence, and presentation
thereof to courts, assuming that the systems are similar to each other and
are to be subjected to the same principles or rules.
For example, it might be possible for Japanese lawyers not to be able
to use results of the U.S. pretrial discovery for Japanese proceedings,
even if the results are available to them. In Japan, as discussed above,
taking of evidence is always required to be initiated, controlled, and conducted by a court. Also, in Japan, documents and statements that can be
used as evidence are required to be submitted by voluntary cooperation
or required to be obtained according to a specific procedure. Documents
or statements other than those submitted voluntarily are required to be
obtained by a court usually for itself by examination of witnesses, issuance
of orders, and the like. Even in exceptional cases where the court requests
cooperation of other governmental authorities or foreign courts, the request is required to be made by the court itself. Accordingly, any document or statement obtained by pretrial discovery conducted in the United
States of America without involvement of a Japanese court and a diplomatic channel cannot be treated immediately as evidence in a Japanese
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court. As to what procedure shall be followed to use them in Japan and
whether or not they can be really used in Japan, there have been no
serious discussions in Japan. However, some practicing lawyers question
availability of such documents or statements. The only way to use a
statement or document obtained by such pretrial discovery would be to
submit it as an equivalent of evidence as if it is submitted voluntarily. At
the time of submission to a court, it would be scrutinized by the court in
connection with the issue whether it can be treated as those obtained with
voluntary cooperation.
The second point of which I want to remind you is that we sometimes
might have two different meanings for the same legal term, depending on
which legal system we have in mind, Japanese or U.S. As noted in the
discussion above, U.S. discovery rules are quite different from the rules
for taking evidence in Japan. On the other hand, if Japan ratifies the Hague
Evidence Convention it will be applicable to the two different systems
and each legal system will have something in common.
I believe that today's discussion will be fruitful if we realize the differences between the Japanese and U.S. systems and are sensitive to the
possible different meanings attributable to the same legal term.
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